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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following scenario: An attorney is contacted by a 
potential client who claims that he has purchased a product that was 
falsely advertised by its manufacturer.  In researching the claim, the 
attorney learns that two public agencies have threatened suit against the 
manufacturer and the filing of a formal complaint appears imminent.  
The manufacturer has already publicly acknowledged its error and 
convened a special committee to determine how to make amends, so any 
complaint would likely be moot and there will be no damages for the 
plaintiff.  Is it in the economic interest of the plaintiff’s attorney to file 
suit against the manufacturer?  Is it in society’s interest for the plaintiff’s 
attorney to file such a suit? 
 *  J.D. 2005, University of San Diego School of Law.  The author wishes to 
thank Professor Thomas Smith for his helpful suggestions and his wife Maura Logan for 
her insights and support.  The author dedicates this casenote to his grandmother, Ruth 
Olsen, and the memory of his grandfather, Karl Olsen (1917-2005), for all of their 
encouragement and love during law school. 




The goal of a sound public policy regarding attorneys’ fees should be 
to harmonize these inquiries as much as possible, but the California 
Supreme Court’s December 2004 decision in Graham v. DaimlerChrysler 
Corp. may produce quite divergent answers.1  The answer to the first 
question is clear: an attorney who files such a suit can not only receive 
fees for “catalyzing” any remedial action on the part of the 
manufacturer, even if the action is likely moot by the time it is 
considered by a court,2 but the attorney may also recover the costs of 
litigating the exact amount of those attorneys’ fees.3  The question whether 
the suit is beneficial to society is more troublesome.  If the Attorney 
General is already investigating the manufacturer, there would appear to 
be little need for a “private attorney general” to enter the fray as well.  
This is especially so where the dispute involves the legal relationship 
between two private parties—there is no imperative here to enforce 
important civil rights against a recalcitrant government entity.  Moreover, 
the manufacturer has already admitted its error, and it is not evident that 
it will offer an inadequate remedy. 
Unfortunately, this is exactly the sort of scenario that the California 
Supreme Court has sanctioned in Graham.  The court has interpreted the 
state’s attorneys’ fees law to encourage such “tagalong” suits that appear 
to have little if any social utility.4  The Graham court has stretched the 
language of California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 far 
beyond what its plain meaning will bear.  The State Supreme Court has 
thus managed to transform an important civil rights fee-shifting statute 
into a tool for private disputes that the dissent darkly predicts will make 
California “a mecca for plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ attorneys throughout the 
country . . . .”5
II.  THE FACTS AND ISSUES OF GRAHAM 
Justice William Brennan once described appeals to determine 
attorneys’ fees as “one of the least socially productive types of litigation 
imaginable.”6  Within this rarefied class of pointless litigation, Graham 
may indeed be the most farcical of all.  The underlying lawsuit did not 
produce even a consent decree, let alone a jury verdict.  The lower courts 
ultimately awarded the plaintiffs’ attorneys $762,830, yet “roughly 90 
 1. 101 P.3d 140 (Cal. 2004), modified, 2005 Cal. LEXIS 16 (Jan. 12, 2005). 
 2. See id. at 147. 
 3. See id. at 157 (“[I]t is well established that plaintiffs and their attorneys may 
recover attorney fees for [litigating] fee-related matters.”). 
 4. Justice Chin refers to such suits as “tagalong” suits in his Graham dissent 
because of their relationship to public agency action.  Id. at 171 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
 5. Id. at 161. 
 6. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 442 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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percent of this award was for fees plaintiffs generated while seeking 
fees.”7
The original dispute arose out of DaimlerChrysler’s attempts to 
develop a “sporty version” of one of its existing truck models.8  The 
original model could tow 6400 pounds, and DaimlerChrysler advertised 
that its 1998 and 1999 Dakota R/T trucks had similar capacities.9  In 
fact, these trucks could safely tow no more than 2000 pounds, lest the 
suspensions bottom out, stressing the frames and increasing fatigue and 
wear.10
By February 1999, the carmaker had established a “response team” to 
address the problem.11  By June, DaimlerChrysler had taken steps to 
replace the incorrect marketing materials and owner’s manuals for the 
trucks it had yet to sell, but the carmaker was still distributing brochures 
misrepresenting the towing capacity as of August 1999.12  The carmaker 
informed those who had already purchased the vehicles that they should 
not attempt to tow more than 2000 pounds, and “began to address 
remedial measures for customers who had bought or leased their Dakota 
R/T’s under the incorrect marketing program.”13  DaimlerChrysler offered 
$300 refunds to buyers who had purchased hitches to safely increase the 
trucks’ towing capacities, and by the summer DaimlerChysler had 
authorized dealers to repurchase or replace the trucks “on a case-by-case 
basis, but only for customers who demanded such a remedy.”14
On July 29, 1999, the Santa Cruz County District Attorney contacted 
DaimlerChrysler about the problem and threatened legal action; on 
August 10, the California Attorney General joined the effort.15  The 
agencies delayed filing an action, to provide an opportunity for the 
carmaker to respond to their charges.16
 7. Graham, 101 P.3d at 163 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
 8. Id. at 144 (majority opinion). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 145. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id.  Unfortunately, the majority opinion stated vaguely that DaimlerChrysler 
started its buy back program “by the summer,” even though the exact date is clearly 
relevant in determining to what extent the plaintiff’s civil action “catalyzed” the 
carmaker’s remedial measures.  If “by the summer” means before August 23, 1999, 
when the action was filed, the plaintiffs have a much weaker argument that they were 
responsible for the remedy the carmaker offered. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 




In the meantime, a group of plaintiffs, only one of whom actually 
lived and purchased his truck in California, filed a complaint in Los 
Angeles County Superior Court on August 23.17  The plaintiffs alleged a 
single breach of warranty cause of action seeking the return of their 
purchase or lease payments, compensatory damages, and attorneys’ 
fees.18  On September 10, DaimlerChrysler offered to repurchase or 
replace all previous Dakota R/T trucks.19  The trial court determined that 
DaimerChrysler had already offered the plaintiffs all of the relief they 
sought and dismissed the action as moot.20
How much is a moot, seven-page complaint that tags on to the 
investigation of two public agencies worth?21  The trial court awarded 
the plaintiffs’ attorneys $762,830 for their efforts.22  The Court of 
Appeals affirmed.23
The only issue that remained for the California Supreme Court on 
appeal was the appropriateness of the attorneys’ fees, and the court 
upheld the award, four to three.24  The majority, purporting to interpret 
California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, virtually ignored the 
intertwined questions of whether private enforcement was “necessary” 
and whether the suit enforced “an important right affecting the public 
interest,” finding these prerequisites for the award of fees met.25  The 
bulk of the court’s discussion centered around whether a plaintiff who 
had plausibly changed the defendant’s behavior through the threat of 
litigation, but never actually achieved a judicial ruling on the merits of 
his claim, could be awarded attorneys’ fees.  The Graham court chose to 
part ways with the United States Supreme Court, which had rejected the 
“catalyst” theory for the award of attorneys’ fees in Buckhannon Board 
& Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health of Human 
Resources in 2001.26  The Graham court thus interpreted the term 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 161 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
 22. Id. at 146. 
 23. Id.  The trial court found the “lodestar” amount to be $329,620, to which it 
applied a multiplier of 2.25 because the case was taken on a contingency fee and 
involved further litigation of the proper attorneys’ fees.  Id. at 156-57.  For discussion of 
the calculation of the lodestar amount and multipliers, see infra notes 106-06 and 
accompanying text. 
 24. Chief Justice George and Justices Kennard and Werdegar joined Justice 
Moreno’s majority opinion; Justices Baxter and Brown joined Justice Chin’s dissent.  
See id. at 161. 
 25. Id. at 156. 
 26. 532 U.S. 598, 610 (rejecting the “catalyst theory” for the award of attorneys’ 
fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act).  
For criticism of Buckhannon, see Robin Stanley, Note, Buckhannon Board & Care 
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“successful party,” as stated in section 1021.5, to mean a “party to 
litigation that achieves its objectives,” rather than a party that forces a 
change in the legal rights between parties.27  Finally, the court found that 
the plaintiffs’ attorneys could be awarded “fees on fees” for the cost of 
litigating the issue of attorneys’ fees.28  The case was remanded to the 
lower courts to consider the award under the Supreme Court’s new 
interpretation of section 1021.5.29
III.  INTERPRETING SECTION 1021.5 
Graham appears to present a straightforward exercise in statutory 
interpretation.  California’s attorneys’ fees statute was adopted in 1977,30 
on the heels of landmark federal attorneys’ fees laws passed by the 94th 
Congress.31  In 1975, Congress enacted fee-shifting provisions for 
violations of the Voting Rights Act,32 and the following year extended 
one-way fee-shifting to all civil rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.33  California’s scheme, however, differs substantially from the 
federal scheme.  The federal Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act34 
was confined, as the title Congress bestowed upon it indicates, to the 
enforcement of civil rights laws that are explicitly enumerated in the 
Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources: To the 
Prevailing Party Goes the Spoils . . . and the Attorney’s Fees, 36 AKRON L. REV. 
363  (2003) (arguing that Buckhannon will discourage civil rights litigation and 
encouraging Congress to intervene). 
 27. Graham, 101 P.3d at 151; cf. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605 (“Our precedents 
thus counsel against holding that the term ‘prevailing party’ authorizes an award of 
attorney’s fees without a corresponding alteration in the legal relationship of the 
parties.”). 
 28. Graham, 101 P.3d at 172 (Chin, J., dissenting) (coining the term “fees on 
fees”). 
 29. Id. at 161. 
 30. The sums paid to lawyers are variously referred to by courts, commentators, 
and Congress as attorney, attorney’s, and attorneys’ fees.  For the sake of consistency, I 
have used the last form throughout, regardless of the number of attorneys actually 
involved, except when quoting opinions or legislative enactments that use the alternative 
forms. 
 31. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West Supp. 2005).  For a discussion of the 
genesis and original policy objectives of section 1021.5, see Jeff Thomas, Comment, The 
Private Attorney General in California—An Evolution of the Species, 18 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 843, 844-47 (1981). 
 32. Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat 400 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e) (2000)). 
 33. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000)). 
 34. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000)). 




statute.35  Where Congress has chosen to extend fee-shifting provisions 
beyond the context of civil rights enforcement, such as certain claims 
under the Endangered Species Act or the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, it has generally done so explicitly.36
The California Legislature, however, drafted the state’s attorneys’ fees 
statute more broadly.37  The specific claims for which attorneys’ fees 
may be awarded are not specified in the statute.  Instead, fees can be 
awarded in “any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an 
important right affecting the public interest.”38  Nonetheless, the legislature 
placed some limits on this provision.  The lawsuit must confer “a 
significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary . . . on the general 
public or a large class of persons . . . .”39  Moreover, the “the necessity 
and financial burden of private enforcement . . . [must] make the award 
appropriate. . . .”40
Although Congress has frequently amended attorneys’ fees provisions 
to encompass new types of claims, the California legislature has left       
section 1021.5 intact since 1977, with one insignificant exception.41  
Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court has steadily expanded the 
scope of the law’s provisions to make it applicable to an ever broader 
array of claims.42  After the Graham decision, however, the plain 
 35. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000) (referring to specific types of claims that have 
been added to the statute since 1976, such as those falling under the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 or the Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000). 
 36. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (2000) (Endangered Species Act); 42 U.S.C. § 
12205 (2000) (Americans with Disabilities Act). 
 37. Section 1021.5 reads in relevant part: 
Upon motion, a court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party against 
one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the 
enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a 
significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on 
the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial 
burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against 
another public entity, are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such 
fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.   
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West Supp. 2005). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. A 1993 amendment added language only relevant to suits involving public 
entities.  See 1993 Cal. Stat. 645. 
 42. An early commentator on section 1021.5 could find only one private attorney 
general case involving a private defendant that was litigated in the first four years after 
the statute was passed.  See Thomas, supra note 31, at 862.  Suits against private actors, 
however, have become increasingly common.  See, e.g., Graham v. DaimlerChrysler, 
101 P.3d 140 (Cal. 2004) (defendant carmaker); Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, 1 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 459 (Ct. App. 1991) (defendant bank). 
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meaning of section 1021.5 can no longer bear the high court’s 
interpretive gloss.43
The California Supreme Court interpreted three important phrases in 
section 1021.5 so as to render them virtually meaningless.  The court has 
conflated “an important right affecting the public interest” with any 
private right having an incidental benefit on third parties.  Its approval of 
the “necessity” of private action under these procedural facts essentially 
removes that language from the statute.  Finally, the court broadly 
construed “successful party” to require that the threat of suit change a 
defendant’s behavior, rather than the filing of a meritorious suit.44
A.  A Public or Private Interest? 
The trial court found that Graham’s suit “resulted in the enforcement 
of an important right affecting the public interest, . . . the protection and 
 43. The Graham majority wisely rejected the resort to the legislative history of section 
1021.5, noting that “[m]aterial showing the motive or understanding of an individual 
legislator, including the bill’s author, his or her staff, or other interested persons, is 
generally not considered.  This is because such materials are generally not evidence of 
the Legislature’s collective intent.” Graham, 101 P.3d at 152 n.5 (quoting Metro. Water 
Dist. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314, 329-30 (Ct. App. 2000)) (internal 
citations omitted).  It would be doubly foolish to infer the intent of legislators from a 
different enactment.  But it is nonetheless interesting, if legally irrelevant, to note that the 
California Assembly, with a similar political composition, had, two years before it 
enacted section 1021.5, passed the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA).  
CAL CIV CODE § 3333.2(b) (2005).  The damage caps on medical malpractice awards by 
MICRA have become President George W. Bush’s model for national medical 
malpractice reform.  MICRA clearly recognized that the overproduction of certain suits 
vindicating private economic rights, see infra Part III-D, will be borne by consumers.  It 
is very difficult to believe that an Assembly that enacted MICRA would therefore have 
intended section 1021.5 to be used so far beyond the context of civil rights as to 
subsidize suits pursuing private economic rights. 
 44. The Graham court’s treatment of the issue of “fees on fees” is also deeply 
flawed, but the judicial reasoning and policy concerns differ from these three core issues, 
and thus the fees on fees issue will not be considered at length in this casenote.  Section 
1021.5 does not mention at all whether attorneys’ fees can be awarded for the fee 
litigation itself, and the California Supreme Court has viewed its inherent authority to 
imply attorneys’ fees quite broadly.  See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1312-15 
(Cal. 1977) (“Serrano III”) (explicitly rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s 
refusal to imply attorneys’ fees without explicit legislative authorization in Alyeska 
Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)).  From a policy perspective, 
appellate litigation over attorneys’ fees is completely unproductive, and should be 
strongly discouraged in a manner that would be inappropriate for the general provisions 
of  section 1021.5.  Because both parties as law firms are likely able to bear the cost of 
litigation, two-way fee-shifting is probably appropriate in such cases. 




enforcement of consumer rights, including highway safety.”45  Because 
of the plaintiffs’ suits, “thousands of consumers received pecuniary 
benefits and enhanced safety.  Thousands more are likely to benefit from 
it if DaimlerChrysler and/or other manufacturers are deterred from 
similar conduct in the future.”46  The Graham majority, reviewing this 
determination under an abuse of discretion standard, asserted that the 
question whether the plaintiffs’ action conferred a public benefit “need 
not detain us long” and affirmed that Graham’s suit satisfied the public 
interest prong of section 1021.5.47
The majority’s flippancy, however, was hardly warranted.  The court 
essentially conflated suits for public benefit, what we may think of as 
traditional civil rights suits, with actions enforcing private rights that 
have an incidental benefit to a large number of third parties.  The 
significance of the distinction is evident under a law and economics 
analysis.  The enforcement of civil rights under a pure American rule, 
where parties pay their own attorneys’ fees regardless of who prevails, 
may be problematic because the value to society of a successfully 
prosecuted suit may be far greater than any economic gain that may 
accrue to the plaintiff or his attorney.  Thus, for example, the value to 
society of a racially integrated school district may far exceed the 
economic damages that plaintiffs who suffer from segregation may be 
able to quantify and prove.48  Attorneys’ fees statutes therefore allow the 
defendant, usually some government entity, to transfer legal resources to 
certain plaintiffs and essentially subsidize a service that is underproduced 
in the marketplace for legal representation.49
However, in suits involving private economic rights, there is no 
“market failure” that results in the underproduction of certain suits.  A 
rational plaintiff will file suit if he believes that his potential recovery, 
discounted for the possibility of failure on the merits, will exceed his 
legal costs.  While the enforcement of, for example, consumer rights 
against corporate defendants might serve a public interest, a code of civil 
 45. Graham, 101 P.3d at 146. 
 46. Id. at 146. 
 47. Id. at 156. 
 48. Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990’s: The Dichotomy 
Between Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 207-11 (1997) (explaining how the 
availability of attorneys’ fees drives civil rights litigation). 
 49. I use the terms “subsidize” and “subsidy” in this paper not to refer to 
government financial support for litigants, but the forced transfer of legal resources, 
through the award of attorneys’ fees, from defendants to plaintiffs.  The plaintiffs’ 
actions are therefore subsidized to the extent that they deviate from the equilibrium 
engendered by the pure American rule, whereby the litigants in a civil action bear their 
own attorneys’ fees.  See Part III-C, infra.  California explicitly recognized the American 
rule as its general rule for attorneys’ fees in 1872 with the enactment of California Code 
of Civil Procedure section 1021. 
LOGAN.DOC 12/22/2005  11:23 AM 
[VOL. 42:  1295, 2005]  The Comparative Catalyst 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1303 
 
procedure without fee-shifting already incentivizes such suits through 
the damages remedies available to the plaintiff and the availability of the 
modern class action device for aggregating claims.50
This principle was well-stated when the California Supreme Court 
first construed the newly enacted section 1021.5 in 1979.  In Woodland 
Hills Residents Association v. City Council of Los Angeles, the high 
court observed, “An award on the ‘private attorney general’ theory is 
appropriate when the cost of the claimant’s legal victory transcends his 
personal interest, that is, when the necessity for pursuing the lawsuit 
placed a burden on the plaintiff ‘out of proportion to his individual stake 
in the matter.’”51  As a state appeals court later explained, “[section] 
1021.5 was not designed as a method for rewarding litigants motivated 
by their own pecuniary interests who only coincidentally protect the 
public interest.”52
The California Supreme Court initially held tightly to this formulation 
in Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Commission.53  The 
court rejected a claim for attorneys’ fees by a private landowner who 
argued that his challenge to the Coastal Commission’s permitting 
process would deter undesirable conduct by the agency in the future, 
thus conferring a broadly shared public benefit.54  More recently, an 
intermediate court of appeals interpreted Pacific Legal Foundation to 
mean that “the possibility that the lawsuit convey[s] a cautionary 
message to the defendant about its conduct [is] insufficient to satisfy the 
significant public benefit requirement.”55
 50. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 51. 593 P.2d 200, 213 (Cal. 1979) (quoting County of Inyo v. City of L.A., 144 
Cal. Rptr. 71, 76 (Ct. App. 1978)).  The phrase “transcend the individual plaintiff’s 
pecuniary interest” derives from Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1314 (“Serrano III”) 
(Cal. 1977), which was decided shortly before the California legislature adopted the 
current statutory language of § 1021.5. 
 52. Beach Colony II Ltd. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 212 Cal. Rptr. 485, 491 (Ct. 
App. 1985). 
 53. 655 P.2d 306 (Cal. 1982). 
 54. Id. at 311. 
 55. Flannery v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 632, 636 (Ct. App. 1998);   
see also Planned Parenthood v. City of Santa Maria, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 391, 395 (Ct. App. 
1993) (interests of the general public were incidental to Planned Parenthood’s primary 
objective of obtaining funds in its action to invalidate a restriction conditioning receipt of 
grant money on waiver of privacy rights); Kistler v. Redwoods Cmty. Coll. Dist., 19 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 417, 423 (Ct. App. 1993) (terminated community college employees improperly 
deprived of accrued vacation pay were not seeking to establish new law on a question of 
public importance but were simply seeking wages due them); Wang v. Div. of Labor 
Standards Enforcement, 268 Cal. Rptr. 669, 675 (Ct. App. 1990) (any public benefit 




Instead of reaffirming this principle of law, however, the Graham 
court confused the matter by relying on a highly problematic Court of 
Appeals decision, Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank.56  That dispute over 
attorneys’ fees grew out of a massive class action against the defendant 
bank for overcharging certain credit card fees.57  The Beasley court, 
however, made no attempt to analyze whether the plaintiffs’ suit 
transcended their own financial interests.  Rather, the court declared that 
“the question whether there was an important public interest at stake 
merely calls for an examination of the subject matter of the action—i.e., 
whether the right involved was of sufficient societal importance.”58  The 
Graham court substituted the mechanical Beasley approach for any 
serious consideration of how Graham vindicated anything other than his 
own personal property rights.59  After Graham, any suit that can be 
resulting from general contractor’s challenge of an administrative interpretation of a 
Labor Code section was incidental to the contractor’s personal financial stake in the 
matter). 
 56. 1 Cal. Rptr. 459 (Ct. App. 1991); see also Graham v. DaimlerChrysler, 101 
P.3d 140, 156 (Cal. 2004) (relying on Beasley approach). 
 57. Beasley, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 461. 
 58. Beasley, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 465 (quoting § 1021.5(a)). 
 59. Graham, 101 P.3d at 156.  What I identify in Part III-A as the public interest 
prong of section 1021.5, that is, whether the suit transcends the personal stake of the 
plaintiffs, has been the source of considerable doctrinal confusion.  The Woodland Hills, 
593 P.2d at 213, and Beach Colony, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 491, courts analyzed the question 
as part of the “necessity” prong, that is, whether “the necessity and financial burden of 
private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate.”  § 1021.5(b).  On the 
other hand, Flannery, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636, considered the financial interests of the 
plaintiff in terms of whether the suit conferred a significant benefit on a large class of 
persons.  § 1021.5(a).  Justice Chin, in his dissent in Graham, raises the issue under the 
public interest prong, describing Graham’s suit as “a vindication of personal rights, not 
an important right affecting the general public.”  101 P.3d at 146, 170 (Chin, J., 
dissenting). 
Fortunately, the differences in these approaches are more superficial than substantive.  
Section 1021.5 is written in general language, and the various prongs inevitably bleed 
into one another.  Whether a “significant benefit” has been “conferred . . . on a large 
class of persons” is clearly an important factor in determining whether the plaintiff has 
vindicated “an important right affecting the public interest.”  Likewise, whether the 
plaintiff vindicated “an important right affecting the public interest” is an important 
factor in determining whether “the necessity and financial burden of private 
enforcement . . . are such as to make the award appropriate.” 
The logical flaw of the Beasley court was to ignore the overarching inquiry 
contemplated in section 1021.5, the necessity of private enforcement, in favor of a 
simplistic and formalistic view of discrete elements of the statute.  The court dismissed 
Wells Fargo’s argument that the plaintiffs’ suit “vindicated only the private rights of 
Wells Fargo cardholders, rather than benefiting the public as a whole.”  Beasley, 1 Cal. 
Rptr.2d at 465.  The court insisted that this argument 
confuses the question whether there was an important public interest at stake 
with the question whether a ‘significant benefit’ has been ‘conferred on the 
general public or a large class of persons . . . .’  The significant benefit 
criterion calls for an examination whether the litigation has had a beneficial 
impact on the public as a whole or on a group of private parties which is 
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characterized as protecting consumers will provide the requisite public 
interest,60 and therefore the test collapses into an inquiry of how large the 
plaintiff class is.61  The California Supreme Court in Graham completely 
ignored the Woodland Hills language about “transcend[ing] . . . personal 
interest;”62 rather than citing its own precedent, it relied on a dubiously 
reasoned appeals court opinion.63
However, the Graham majority stretches the definition of public 
interest even beyond Beasley.  While Beasley was a class action to 
recover fees “on behalf of hundreds of thousands of Wells Fargo 
sufficiently large to justify a fee award.  This criterion thereby implements the 
general requirement that the benefit provided by the litigation inures primarily 
to the public.  In contrast, the question whether there was an important public 
interest at stake merely calls for an examination of the subject matter of the 
action—i.e., whether the right involved was of sufficient societal importance. 
Id.  Wells Fargo, however, was not confused in questioning whether the suit vindicated a 
right that transcended the personal financial interests of the plaintiffs, just as Woodland 
Hills, Beach Colony, and Flannery had considered before under various prongs of 
section 1021.5.  The Beasley court replaced any such inquiry with a simple two-part test: 
is the subject matter of the action important, and does it benefit a large number of 
people?  While the satisfaction of this test is no doubt essential for an award of attorneys’ 
fees under section 1021.5, this simplistic test cannot tell us whether a suit transcends the 
personal interests of the plaintiffs, let alone whether this renders private enforcement of 
the right necessary. 
 60. The Beasley court observed that consumer protection actions “have long been 
judicially recognized to be vital to the public interest.”  Id. at 465 (citations omitted).  
But how does the judiciary determine the vindication of rights granted by a statute 
enacted by the legislature is “vital to the public interest” while the vindication of rights 
granted by another statute is not?  Under Beasley, and now Graham, the judge is 
essentially asked to render his or her own personal judgment about the importance of 
various laws.  This certainly contravenes any notion that the judge is the faithful agent of 
the legislature in interpreting the law.  The California Supreme Court acknowledged this 
in Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1315 (Cal. 1977) (“Serrano III”), which recognized 
the inherent power of state courts to award attorneys’ fees, but the court attempted to 
avoid the problem of judges selecting which laws to enforce by declaring that the 
vindication of any right under the state Constitution could justify an award of attorneys’ 
fees. 
 61. Beasley, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 465 (“The question whether a significantly large 
number of ‘private’ persons was benefited so as to justify a fee award is pertinent only to 
the significant benefit criterion . . . .”). 
 62. Woodland Hills, 593 P.2d at 213. 
 63. Graham, 101 P.3d at 156 (relying on the “public interest” and “significant 
benefit” rules of Beasley, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459, a California Court of Appeals decision).  
The irony of this test is that the strongest case for an award of attorneys’ fees under 
section 1021.5 is the modern consumer class action, which, by pooling claims, provides 
incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys that would be infeasible to pursue individually, and 
allowing for recovery of fees out of a common fund. 




customers,”64 the plaintiffs in Graham were never certified as a class.65  
In fact, only one of the plaintiffs actually lived and purchased his truck 
in California.66  This, of course, did not trouble the trial court, which 
found that “thousands of consumers received pecuniary benefits and 
enhanced safety.  Thousands more are likely to benefit from it if 
DaimlerChrysler and/or other manufacturers are deterred from similar 
conduct in the future.”67
The problem with this characterization of the case is that the plaintiffs 
filed suit on a single claim of breach of warranty.68  They sought no 
declaratory or injunctive relief that could be seen to “transcend” their 
personal economic interests.69  As the dissent points out, “Maximizing 
plaintiffs’ pecuniary gain does nothing to enhance public safety.”70  
Unfortunately, the Graham majority opinion sanctions an antithetical 
proposition.  The pursuit of private economic interest provides an 
incidental deterrent that renders it a public interest eligible for subsidized 
legal resources. 
The ramifications of this holding are potentially explosive.  It is 
difficult to see why the prosecution of any tort suit against a corporate or 
government defendant could not result in fee-shifting to plaintiffs.71  
Any lawsuit filed by a plaintiff has the potential to pressure a defendant 
 64. Beasley, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 465. 
 65. Graham, 101 P.3d at 145. 
 66. Id. at 162 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. at 146. 
 68. Id. at 161 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
 69. Symptomatic of the majority’s misapprehension of the rationale behind section  
1021.5 is its decision to view this prong of the test under an abuse of discretion standard, 
following Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 118, 146 (Ct. App. 1997) 
(quoting Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 246 Cal. Rptr. 806, 812 (Ct. App. 1988)).  This 
deference to the trial court may be appropriate if applying section 1021.5 merely requires 
counting the number of actual plaintiffs or those whom it can plausibly be claimed 
benefited from the action.  However, determining whether an action transcends personal 
interest is essentially a question of law concerning which types of suits are appropriately 
subsidized by defendants.  Thus, in Pacific Legal Foundation, the high court found that 
the plaintiff homeowners’ suit against the Coastal Commission was not eligible for 
attorneys’ fees as a matter of law because it did not affect a public right broader than 
their interests as landowners.  Pac. Legal Found. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 655 P.2d 306, 
311 (Cal. 1982). 
 70. Graham, 101 P.3d at 170 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
 71. In fact, it is difficult to see why the Graham rationale could not be applied to 
corporations suing corporations for unfair business practices, antitrust violations, and the 
like.  Preventing corporate abuses is certainly a “public interest” that will benefit a large 
swathe of the citizenry.  In theory, such an application of the Graham approach should 
be undermined by section 1021.5(c)—that an award of attorneys’ fees is only appropriate 
if “such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.”  
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West Supp. 2005).  Presumably, corporate litigants 
have the resources to support their legal actions such that it would not be in the interests 
of justice to award attorneys’ fees out of their damage awards.  However, there is no 
discussion of this in Graham as an equitable concept. 
LOGAN.DOC 12/22/2005  11:23 AM 
[VOL. 42:  1295, 2005]  The Comparative Catalyst 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1307 
 
to change some aspect of its policy—this is inherent in the potentially 
coercive power of a civil action.  Thus, any plaintiffs’ attorney who 
drafts a complaint so as to link his clients’ personal economic interests 
with some marginal deterrent benefit will have a winning argument for 
attorneys’ fees under Graham.72  By obliterating the distinction between 
suits that deserve special subsidy and typical private actions that may 
have an incidental public benefit, the court has turned an important civil 
rights statute into a boon for plaintiffs seeking purely economic 
recoveries. 
B.  Relationship with Public Enforcement 
The Graham decision has rendered the second requirement of 
California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 virtually meaningless 
as well.  The statute provides that attorney fees may be awarded if “the 
necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement 
by one public entity against another public entity, are such as to make 
the award appropriate . . . .”73
This requirement that private enforcement be necessary has firm 
grounding in public policy.74  Public agency enforcement of rights is 
preferable in most instances, and almost certainly here where the 
purported public interest is the prevention of false advertising.75  Public 
prosecutors do not benefit financially from bringing certain cases, so 
 72. The facts of the Graham case itself demonstrate that the court’s definition of 
“public benefit” will permit an award of attorneys’ fees to generate a net economic loss 
for society.  The cost of modifying the Dakota truck so that its towing capacity would 
conform to what was advertised was $300 per truck, and fewer than 1000 Californians 
purchased the affected trucks.  Graham, 101 P.3d at 144-45.  The case does not mention 
any injury that occurred because of the false advertising, and it appears that at the time 
the complaint was filed, DaimlerChrysler already “notified existing buyers of the error 
[and] told them not to attempt to tow more than 2,000 pounds . . . .”  Id. at 145.  The 
danger of future accidents was thus abated, and so the benefit accruing to all the 
California truck purchasers, whether or not they were plaintiffs in this case, was 
collectively no more than $300,000 ($300 x 1000 truck purchasers).  However, even 
discounting the appellate litigation over fees, the lodestar amount awarded to the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys was $329,620.  Id. at 146.  Graham thus sanctions the award of fees 
where the costs of litigation exceed the recovery, and there is no intangible public right 
being protected.  The economic irrationality of this holding is only compounded by 
considering the defendant’s legal costs and avoidance costs. 
 73. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West Supp. 2005) (emphasis added). 
 74. The policy justifications for the private attorney general model are discussed in 
Thomas, supra note 31, 846-47. 
 75. See Graham, 101 P.3d at 146 (discussing the trial court finding that the 
plaintiffs’ efforts secured consumer protection). 




they may choose to pursue the violations they find most egregious.  
Plaintiffs’ attorneys, on the other hand, are quite naturally attracted to 
the cases that will generate the largest fees and damage awards, 
regardless of whether such actions benefit society the most.  Plaintiffs’ 
attorneys likewise may represent clients whose interests conflict with 
those other aggrieved members of the public because of the finite 
resources available for compensation.76  Public prosecutors, however, 
are not, at least in theory, beholden to the interests of a discrete group of 
clients. 
The private attorney general model of vindicating public rights is 
preferable only in certain clearly defined situations.  For example, the 
private attorney general model is essential for protecting private citizens 
against government violations of their civil rights.  Forcing one 
government entity to litigate such claims against another government 
entity runs counter to the basic rationales for our adversarial system of 
civil justice.77  Likewise, the private attorney general model may be 
appropriate where government resources are inadequate to bring suit.78
Neither justification, however, is present in the Graham case.  To 
the extent that Graham’s suit attempts to vindicate a public interest at 
all—preventing false advertising—there is no reason to believe that it is 
necessary or even preferable that this right be vindicated by a private 
party.  The defendant is not a government entity, and therefore there is 
no concern that a civil rights challenge will not be vigorously 
prosecuted. 
Even more shocking in Graham is that both the Santa Cruz District 
Attorney and the California Attorney General had initiated an 
investigation of DaimlerChrysler’s practices by late July 1999.79  When 
Graham’s attorney filed a complaint on August 23, the public agency 
actions were already under way.80  While it is true that the public entities 
had not filed suit against the carmaker, they had refrained because they 
wished to give DaimlerChrysler an opportunity to respond before 
 76. See, for example, the United States Supreme Court’s discussion of this problem 
in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).  The asbestos litigation 
would almost certainly bankrupt the corporation, so in settlement the plaintiffs’ attorneys 
were required to apportion damages among those who had already experienced medical 
problems and those who were only at risk for future problems.  Id. at 603-04. 
 77. See Thomas, supra note 31, at 856 (“Private enforcement is necessary when 
the public entities fail to litigate the case.”). 
 78. In Serrano III, in which the California Supreme Court recognized the 
applicability of the private attorney general model for vindication of constitutional rights, 
the court offered the unsatisfying explanation that “for various reasons the burden of 
enforcement is not always adequately carried by [public prosecutors].”  Serrano v. Priest, 
569 P.2d 1303, 1313 (Cal. 1977). 
 79. Graham, 101 P.3d at 145. 
 80. Id. 
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commencing litigation.81  In this brief window of several weeks, Graham’s 
attorney filed his tagalong suit.82  It is simply perverse to insist, as the 
trial court apparently did, that the public agencies’ desire to prevent 
litigation strengthened the plaintiffs’ attorney’s argument that his own 
intervention was therefore necessary. 
Even if one were to argue that the intervention of the public entities 
did not render the private action duplicative, it is appropriate to compare 
the records of the public and private actions in placing pressure on 
DaimlerChrysler to change its behavior.  Graham’s action was dismissed 
as moot, and it is likely that the complaint was moot the moment it was 
filed.83  The plaintiffs therefore received no compensation that the 
carmaker had not already offered at the time the private suit commenced.  
On the other hand, the public entity suit, which focused on the false 
advertising claim and not the breach of warranty claim, continued after 
the private suit was dismissed, as the carmaker continued to distribute 
misleading marketing materials.84  DaimlerChrysler eventually settled 
the matter with the government for $75,000 and agreed not to use the 
materials again.85  The private plaintiffs never won a penny or wrung a 
legal commitment out of the carmaker not to use the false marketing 
materials. 
The California Supreme Court reviewed the award of attorneys’ fees 
to the plaintiffs’ attorneys in this case under an abuse of discretion 
standard.  On the facts on this case, however, it is very difficult to see 
how a future trial court could possibly abuse its discretion by finding 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. DaimlerChrysler sent a letter to all purchasers of the Dakota R/T truck on June 
16, 1999, acknowledging its error.  Id. at 145.  By the “summer,” the carmaker had 
“authorized dealers to repurchase or replace Dakota R/Ts on a case-by-case basis, but 
only for customers who demanded such a remedy.”  Id.  After the complaint was filed, 
DaimlerChrysler agreed to repurchase all of the falsely advertised trucks.  Id.  The only 
relief that DaimlerChrysler offered after the filing of the complaint that it had not offered 
before was to actively offer to repurchase the trucks, rather than simply to acquiesce in 
this demand from its customers.  Id.  The Graham court, at the request of the California 
Attorney General, adopted a rule that the “plaintiff seeking attorney fees under a catalyst 
theory must first reasonably attempt to settle the matter short of litigation.”  Id. at 155 
(citations omitted).  Thus, if Graham failed to present his demands to DaimerChrysler, he 
has not met this consultation requirement.  If he did make such demands, the trial court’s 
findings of fact indicate that he would have received an offer of repurchase, so his suit 
would have been moot at the moment it was filed. 
 84. Id. at 145-46. 
 85. Id. at 146. 




that such a tagalong suit is “necessary” and thus fulfills the strictures of  
section 1021.5.  Graham is the prototypical example of when a private 
attorney is not appropriate.  The California Supreme Court’s refusal to 
reverse the lower court’s finding of the necessity of private 
enforcement—when two public entities have threatened suit and the 
defendant has already conceded its mistake in a written letter to its 
consumers—has essentially read this requirement out of the statute. 
C.  What is a Successful Party? 
The most contentious issue in the suit, however, was whether Graham 
could be considered a “successful party” to whom the award of attorneys’ 
fees was appropriate under section 1021.5.  The California Supreme 
Court has never interpreted the phrase “successful party” to mean that a 
party may receive attorneys’ fees under section 1021.5 only if it pursues 
a suit to a final judgment.  In Westside Community for Independent 
Living, Inc. v. Obledo, the high court rejected such an interpretation of 
the language.86  Instead, the court, per Chief Justice Rose Bird, endorsed 
the “catalyst test,” which provides that a “plaintiff will be considered a 
‘successful party’ where an important right is vindicated ‘by activating 
defendants to modify their behavior.’”87
Although a number of lower federal courts also adopted this “catalyst” 
approach to defining “successful party,”88 the United States Supreme 
Court rejected it in Buckhannon.89  Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 
writing for a five-to-four court, observed that the catalyst theory “allows 
an award where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal 
relationship of the parties.”90  Thus, a “defendant’s voluntary change in 
 86. 657 P.2d 365 (Cal. 1983).   
 87. Id. at 367 (quoting Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 1981)) 
(internal quotations omitted).  Justice Chin, however, argues that Westside Community 
did not adopt the catalyst approach because the claim for attorneys’ fees was ultimately 
rejected, rendering the statements about who may constitute a catalyst to be dicta.  This 
is somewhat problematic, however, as the Westfield Community court had to determine if 
the plaintiffs’ actions were sufficient to invoke the catalyst theory in order to reach the 
question of causation. 
 88. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602 n.3 (2001) (collecting the circuit court cases embracing the 
“catalyst” approach). 
 89. Id. at 610.  The Graham court was dismissive of the United States Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of what constitutes a “successful party.”  Graham, 101 P.3d at 
150.  Interestingly, the Westside Community court a generation before had explained that 
“[section] 1021.5 codified the common law theory of the private attorney general.  The 
Legislature relied heavily on federal precedent when enacting the statute, and California 
courts often look to federal decisions when interpreting it.”  Westside Cmty., 657 P.2d at 
367 n.5. 
 90. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605. 
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conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to 
achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the 
change.”91
The disagreements between Chief Justices Bird and Rehnquist, and 
later between the majority and dissent in Graham, reveal a difficult 
problem in defining who is a successful party.  If a defendant can escape 
attorneys’ fees by voluntarily changing his conduct, he will have an 
incentive to avoid any judicially sanctioned settlement.  The cessation of 
his conduct will moot the claim, at least for injunctive relief, and the 
plaintiffs’ attorney will have no right to fees.92  On the other hand, 
 91. Id.  It should be noted, however, that Buckhannon did not present exactly the 
same question as did Graham.  In the former, the plaintiff was a corporation that 
operated assisted living facilities.  West Virginia’s Fire Marshal attempted to shut down 
its facilities because “some of the residents were incapable of ‘self-preservation’ as 
defined under state law.”  Id. at 600.  Buckhannon sued on behalf of itself and similarly 
situated care homes on the ground that the state’s action violated the federal Fair 
Housing Amendments Act (FHAA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).  Id. 
at 600-01.  The following year, the West Virginia legislature enacted a law that repealed 
the “self-preservation” requirement.  Id. at 601.  Buckhannon argued that its suit had 
“catalyzed” the legislature’s remedial action.  Id. at 600-02. 
Buckhannon thus differs from Graham in four important respects, three of which 
present a more sympathetic argument for the award of attorneys’ fees than in Graham.  
First, as Buckhannon sought only declaratory and injunctive relief, clearly its action 
transcended its parochial economic interests more than Graham’s suit.  Second, 
Buckhannon sued a state agency, not a private party, and thus the necessity of private 
enforcement was surely greater than in Graham.  Third, Congress explicitly extended 
one-way fee-shifting provisions to both the FHAA and the ADA, while the California 
Supreme Court has expanded the range of suits eligible for fee-shifting under section 
1021.5 without the further endorsement of the state legislature. 
On the other hand, Buckhannon argued that it had catalyzed a change in policy of a 
state legislature, which presents seemingly insuperable evidentiary problems.  How does 
one determine the reasons that individual state legislators voted for the bill?  Would it 
matter if most knew nothing of Buckhannon’s suit but otherwise thought the reform to be 
desirable?  Individual legislators had no personal economic stake that was threatened by 
a successful suit, so it is difficult to assess the catalyzing effect of the suit. 
 92. Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed skepticism in his Buchkannon majority 
opinion that the failure to adopt the catalyst rule would encourage defendants to 
unilaterally moot suits, labeling such claims “entirely speculative and unsupported by 
any empirical evidence . . . .”  Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608. 
Even if empirical research reveals that defendants do seek to moot actions to avoid 
attorneys’ fees, the risk of such action is already built into the contingency fee multiplier 
that the court may award.  For example, in Graham, the plaintiffs’ fees were multiplied 
by a factor of 2.25 to account for the risk of bringing the action as a contingency.  
Graham, 101 P.3d at 163 (Chin, J., dissenting).  Moreover, in those cases where the 
defendant moots the action by ceasing the objectionable practice, the plaintiff has won 
what he sought, and the defendant’s costs in conforming its practices are minimized.  
One would think that such a result would be welcomed rather than shunned. 




awarding attorneys’ fees without the “imprimatur” of the court on the 
merits could dramatically encourage pointless litigation.  Even if the 
parties were to avoid a trial, they would be required to litigate the merits 
of the case to determine whether there is a proper causal nexus between 
the civil action and the defendant’s “voluntary” change in conduct. 
The Graham court apparently believed that it solved this problem by 
requiring courts awarding attorneys’ fees to ensure that a causal nexus 
exists between the plaintiff’s attorneys’ action and the defendant’s 
change in conduct,93 and that the claim is “not frivolous, unreasonable, 
or groundless.”94  The fatal flaw in the majority’s line of reasoning is 
that it is not merely actions that are egregious enough to be legally 
frivolous that result in breakdowns of judicial economy, but the filing of 
large numbers of suits that have little chance of success on the merits.  
Under California law, an action is defined as “frivolous” only if it is 
“totally and completely without merit” or brought “for the sole purpose 
of harassing an opposing party.”95  The Graham rule will only inhibit the 
filing of the most blatantly meritless suits, which are already 
discouraged by the sanctions and cost-shifting provisions of California 
Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5. 
The goal of an attorneys’ fees regime and the tort system in general 
should be to encourage the optimal number of lawsuits that will produce 
social benefits.  The difficult question is how the system should treat the 
vast number of suits that have some merit, that is, that are neither legally 
 93. The Graham court also adopted the Attorney General’s proposal that “a 
plaintiff seeking attorney fees under a catalyst theory must first reasonably attempt to 
settle the matter short of litigation.”  Id. at 155. 
 94. Id. at 154 (quoting Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 752 n.9 (9th Cir. 1995)).  
The majority states that the inquiry into the merits of the case should be similar to that 
undertaken in considering a motion for a preliminary injunction.  Id.  This would seem to 
indicate that the majority has in mind a weighing of the “likelihood of success on the 
merits,” the test I propose in Part IV.  Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 
344 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 2003).  However, the Graham majority characterizes this 
inquiry as  “a determination at a minimum that the questions of law or fact are grave and 
difficult,” Graham, 101 P.3d at 154 (internal quotations omitted), which does not appear 
to require an examination of the merits at all. 
  Moreover, the Graham majority explicitly states that it is adopting the two-pronged test 
developed by the lower federal courts, the second prong of which is that “a finding that 
the lawsuit was not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.”  Id. (quoting Stivers v. 
Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 752 n.9 (9th Cir. 1995)).  It then proceeds to reject a proposed 
requirement that the plaintiff’s action be able to survive a motion to dismiss on the 
grounds that this rule is too narrow, excluding suits that have been unilaterally mooted 
by defendants.  Id. at 154-55.  The court does explain that the favorable result for the 
plaintiff must be “achieved by threat of victory, not by dint of nuisance or threat of 
expense.”  Id. at 154 (internal quotations and citation omitted).  The court’s willingness, 
however, to sanction fees on the facts of this case indicates that the threat of victory need 
not be a promising one.  After Graham, the rule appears to contain no requirement that 
the suit be likely to prevail on the merits, merely that it is not frivolous.  Id. 
 95. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5(b)(2) (West Supp. 2005). 
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frivolous nor clearly persuasive.  California has chosen to address this 
issue by adopting a strong preference for the settlement of civil disputes.  
For example, the state has granted trial court judges the authority to 
compel settlement conferences among the litigants,96 and has enacted 
modified two-way cost-shifting following settlement offers.97  Implicit in 
this policy is that it is neither possible nor desirable for all civil actions 
to be litigated.  Instead, an action has a “value” that is determined by the 
damages that would be expected at trial discounted by the probability 
that the suit may fail for substantive or procedural reasons, minus the 
costs of litigating the suit.98  A well-functioning tort system will strike a 
balance between the incentives of plaintiffs and defendants so that the 
settlement value of individual claims closely approximate their social 
utility. 
The Graham approach, however, serves to upset the delicate equilibrium 
that exists under a pure American rule in two fundamental ways.  First, 
the Graham regime decouples the link in suits seeking to vindicate 
private rights between the merits of an action and the plaintiffs’ 
attorney’s incentives to bring suit.  Where plaintiffs’ attorneys operate 
on contingency fees under a pure American rule, the value of a suit will 
be the expected economic recovery for the plaintiff multiplied by the 
probability of success on the merits, minus the costs of litigation to the 
plaintiff’s attorney.99  This system, while imperfect, at least serves to 
discourage some socially unproductive suits, such as those in which the 
cost of litigation would exceed the recovery, or nonfrivolous suits in 
which the chances of success on the merits are remote. 
Under Graham, however, a plaintiffs’ attorney can garner fees in 
virtually any tort action so long as he can characterize the suit as a 
“consumer protection” action that benefits a large number of people.  No 
expected return for his client is too trifling, as he may collect fees no 
matter how small the recovery.  Indeed, in Graham, the clients received 
no award of damages at all, but the attorneys still won $762,830 in 
fees.100  The majority was wholly unconcerned that this staggering 
 96. CAL. CT. R. 222(a) (2005). 
 97. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998 (West Supp. 2005). 
 98. For a discussion of the valuation of suits for plaintiffs’ attorneys, see Beasley 
v. Wells Fargo Bank, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459, 462-64 (Ct. App. 1991). 
 99. For a general discussion of the role of attorneys’ fees and fee-shifting statutes 
in altering the litigants’ strategies during settlement, see Jonathan T. Molot, How U.S. 
Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J. 59, 69-81 (1997). 
 100. Graham v. DaimlerChrysler, 101 P.3d 140, 161 (Cal. 2004) (Chin, J., dissenting). 




amount might have been far out of proportion to the harm suffered by 
the plaintiffs or the reasonable avoidance costs for DaimlerChrysler. 
Second, the various holdings in Graham together transform the 
incentives for bringing tagalong suits.  Consider again the hypothetical 
attorney in Part I deciding whether to file suit.  His potential fee award 
for filing suit is huge—the attorneys in Graham earned approximately 
$76,000, excluding fees on fees, for filing a seven-page complaint.101  
After Graham, however, the potential risks to the plaintiffs’ attorneys in 
pursuing such a windfall are minimal.  The attorney need not be concerned 
that the costs of litigation may outweigh the potential damages because 
his fees are not awarded out of the damages.  He need not consider the 
costs of actually litigating the case, as no ruling on the merits is 
necessary to collect his fees.  Most importantly, he need not be 
concerned that his case may be far from meritorious.  So long as the case 
is not frivolous, he is eligible to recover fees.  The plaintiff’s attorney 
risks very little of his own time and capital in preparing and filing such a 
complaint. 
The most important variables for the plaintiffs’ attorney’s calculations 
are whether the defendant will actually change its policy and whether the 
plaintiff can establish a causal nexus between the filing of the complaint 
and that change.  In tagalong suits, the defendants may change their 
policies anyway in response to public agency pressures.  But, as Graham 
clearly shows, the existence of parallel government action will not 
invalidate a plaintiffs’ attorney’s claim for attorneys’ fees.  As a practical 
matter, the causal nexus will normally be shown by circumstantial 
evidence of the date of the plaintiff’s filing, the defendant’s knowledge 
of the suit, and the date the policy changed.  The low costs and risks of 
preparing complaints thus provide plaintiffs’ attorneys every incentive to 
tag along to public agency actions in the hope that the dates will 
properly align to support an award of attorneys’ fees.  If a plaintiffs’ 
attorney is diligent in following public agency investigations and files 
enough suits, he is sure to reap a windfall eventually.  These are the 
incentives that Graham has created. 
IV.  REFORMING GRAHAM: THE COMPARATIVE CATALYST 
Justice Chin recognized in his dissent that the Graham decision “goes 
farther than this court has ever gone before—indeed, so far as I can tell, 
further than any other court has ever gone . . . ,” placing California far 
outside of the mainstream of federal and other state practices regarding 
 101. Id. at 163 (Chin, J., dissenting) (“[R]oughly 90 percent of [the $762,830 
attorneys’ fees] award was for fees plaintiffs generated while seeking fees.”). 
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attorneys’ fees.102  The Graham decision also appears to be out of step 
with the voters of California, who in November 2004 passed Proposition 
64, which entrenches in state law a strong preference for public over 
private enforcement of certain consumer rights under California 
Business and Professions Code section 17200.103  The potential for a 
further explosion of litigation in California through the application of 
section 1021.5 to run-of-the-mill tort suits militates in favor of a similar 
intervention through the initiative process or by the state legislature. 
Reform of California’s attorneys’ fees statute in light of Graham must 
have two guiding principles.  First, the phrase “important right affecting 
the public interest” should be tightened so that it will encompass civil 
rights claims, but cannot be used to turn every breach of warranty action 
into a “public interest” suit.  The preferred solution would be for 
California to follow the federal model and specify the individual statutes 
under which claims can give rise to attorneys’ fees.  This would allow 
the legislators who devise a particular regulatory scheme to choose the 
degree to which they believe private enforcement is appropriate. 
There will still be borderline cases, though, such as section 17200 
claims, in which it is difficult to adopt a blanket rule.  Therefore, the 
legislative process should adopt some language similar to the following: 
Attorneys’ fees shall not be awarded where the plaintiff succeeds in altering the 
behavior of a defendant primarily through the threat of compensatory damages, 
out of which the plaintiff would receive any recovery, imposed on the 
defendant.104
 102. Id. at 161 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
 103. For a thorough discussion of the abuses of the private attorney general model 
which gave rise to Proposition 64, see Mathieu Blackston, Comment, California’s Unfair 
Competition Law—Making Sure the Avenger Is Not Guilty of the Greater Crime, 41 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 1833, 1836 (2004). 
 104. This clause anticipates California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s proposal to 
“redirect” punitive damage awards.  Because punitive damages are meant to penalize and 
deter the defendant, and not to compensate the plaintiff, such damages should be paid to 
state coffers rather than individual plaintiffs, much as a civil penalty in a securities or tax 
fraud case brought by the federal government.  Governor Schwarzenegger’s plan would 
therefore require that seventy-five percent of the punitive damage award to be paid to the 
state.  Adam Liptak, Schwarzenegger Sees Money for State in Punitive Damages, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 30, 2004, at A16.  In the event that such a proposal were enacted into law, 
the language I have proposed would still allow for a recovery of attorneys’ fees if only 
punitive damages were awarded.  This would be a classic case in which the financial 
incentives to the plaintiff might not otherwise be adequate to vindicate a public interest 
that transcends the parochial financial interests of the plaintiff. 




An award of attorneys’ fees is only appropriate where the relief sought and 
obtained by the plaintiff transcends the private economic rights that he or she 
may vindicate. 
Under this rule, Graham would not be able to receive attorneys’ fees for 
his breach of warranty claim because DaimerChrysler was only reacting 
to the threat of damages.  If, however, Graham had sought and achieved an 
injunction against DaimlerChrysler’s false marketing practices, he would be 
eligible for attorneys’ fees, because this sort of action may otherwise have 
been an underproduced action in the market for legal representation. 
The second guiding principle in reforming California’s statute should 
be redefining the catalyst model to weed out awards for socially 
unproductive tagalong suits.  The abolition of the catalyst rule through a 
requirement that the plaintiff actually achieve a ruling on the merits of 
the case would be most effective to prevent such suits.  However, if this 
is not politically possible, a compromise solution is presented by a 
“comparative catalyst” model that would discourage the most egregious 
tagalong suits, yet also remove the incentive of defendants to unilaterally 
moot actions against them to prevent an award of attorneys’ fees. 
Under the Graham approach, the trial judge determines whether the 
plaintiff’s complaint was a “substantial factor” in changing the defendant’s 
behavior.105  Such a binary determination, though, does not accurately 
reflect the value of the suit to society, especially considering the inherently 
slippery meaning of the term “substantial.”  Defendants may face many 
legal pressures to change their behavior.  In some cases, especially civil 
rights cases, the private suit may be the exclusive pressure applied to the 
defendant.  In tagalong suits, however, the private suit is part of a mix of 
legal pressures including the threat of public enforcement.  The marginal 
value to society of a meritorious suit in the first instance is far greater 
than the second, even though both may be deemed “substantial” by a 
court awarding attorneys’ fees. 
A comparative catalyst standard would instruct the trial judge to 
determine to what degree the plaintiff’s action contributed to the overall 
mix of legal pressures that forced the defendant to change his conduct.  
The value of the suit would be expressed as a multiplier between zero 
and one, then multiplied by the lodestar amount.106  The comparative 
catalyst would act just like multipliers for contingency fees, tackling 
difficult legal issues, or the like, that are recognized under current law, 
except that it could be used to reduce or maintain the value of an award 
 105. Graham, 101 P.3d at 149. 
 106. The lodestar amount is defined as the “basic fee for comparable legal services 
in the community,” determined by multiplying the time expended by the attorneys on the 
suit by the prevailing hourly rate.  Ketchum v. Moses, 17 P.3d 735, 741 (Cal. 2001). 
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rather than to increase it.107  Attorneys who bring the most socially valuable 
suits—usually civil rights cases or consumer cases seeking injunctive 
relief where public agencies have refused to act—would likely receive 
full compensation, because their actions would be the sole source of 
legal pressure.  On the other hand, in a case such as Graham in which 
the civil complaint tagged along with an ongoing public investigation, 
the civil suit may have constituted only, say, sixty percent of the legal 
pressure that forced the changes.  Thus, if the trial court in Graham had 
adopted such a finding under a comparative catalyst rule, the court 
would have awarded the plaintiff’s attorneys $457,698 ($762,830 x 
0.6).108
The advantage of the comparative catalyst approach is that it creates a 
sliding scale to measure the social contribution of actions filed by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys that aligns the incentive to file suit with the social 
good that results.  The comparative catalyst approach thus considers not 
just the “fair market value” of the suit to an attorney, but the fair market 
value of the suit to society.109  If a civil action would be duplicative of 
public agency actions, the fair market value of the suit to society is 
lower; the attorney would have less of an incentive to file suit because of 
the multiplier.  This approach more accurately conforms to the private 
attorney general model—private litigation should receive special 
encouragement in the form of attorneys’ fees provisions if the actions of 
public entities are inadequate to the task. 
In his dissent in Graham, Justice Chin observed that the catalyst 
theory requires courts to make the very difficult assessment of the 
alleged causal connection between the filing of the civil complaint and a 
defendant’s decision to change its behavior.110  This is especially 
problematic where the defendant is a corporate or government entity 
whose subjective intent is elusive.  It may be argued that a comparative 
catalyst approach would complicate this matter even further by requiring 
 107. California law also recognizes multipliers for “the skill displayed in 
presenting” the legal issues to the court and “the extent to which the nature of the 
litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys . . . .”  Id. 
 108. Note that such a comparative catalyst rule would not exclude the other 
multipliers currently applied by the courts.  In Graham, for example, the calculation 
would have been the lodestar amount multiplied by the contingency fee multiplier (2.25) 
multiplied by the comparative catalyst fraction (0.6).  Graham, 101 P.3d at 146. 
 109. See Ketchum, 17 P.3d at 741 (discussing lodestar multiplier’s correlation with 
fair market value). 
 110. Graham, 101 P.3d at 168 (Chin, J., dissenting). 




a court to pin down not only whether the defendant was influenced by 
the complaint, but by how much. 
This problem, however, can be avoided if the court awarding the 
attorneys’ fees adopts an objective rather a subjective test for the actual 
apportionment of credit for catalyzing behavior.  The court should weigh 
the complaint as would a reasonable attorney representing the defendant 
in the case.  It should examine whether the complaint is facially moot or 
frivolous in light of the facts conceded in the case.  The court need not 
undertake a probing inquiry of the merits.  It should proceed much as it 
would in considering the likelihood of success on the merits in an 
emergency injunction request.111  In assessing the pressure asserted by a 
complaint, the court would thus consider both the merits, at least 
superficially, and the role of the suit in changing the defendant’s conduct 
vis-à-vis the actions of public agency action and voluntary actions already 
commenced at the time the complaint was filed.  It is true that a judge may 
not understand the factual situation giving rise to the case in the same 
intimate detail as the defense attorney, and thus he or she does not know 
whether discovery will strengthen or weaken the plaintiffs’ claims.  
Nonetheless, trial court judges in California have extensive experience in 
overseeing settlement negotiations and are well positioned to evaluate how 
a particular complaint may affect the overall mix of legal pressures. 
Another benefit of a well-drafted comparative catalyst rule is that it 
could dramatically reduce the appellate litigation over attorneys’ fees 
which Justice Brennan decried.112  If the abuse of discretion standard is 
retained, it will be much more difficult to overturn a trial judge’s 
designation of some fraction for attorneys’ fees rather than a binary 
all-or-nothing decision.  In practice, a California appeals court is less 
likely to overturn a forty percent award it believes should be sixty 
percent than a zero percent award that, given two choices, it believes 
should have been one hundred percent.  Such, for better or worse, has been 
the experience with appellate review of large punitive and noneconomic 
damage awards.  Appellate courts in such situations have usually 
overturned such awards only if they believe the order of magnitude to be 
wrong, not just that the award was off by twenty percent.113
 111. In considering a motion for a preliminary injunction, a court may consider the 
“likelihood of success on the merits,” even though at this time little or no discovery may 
have taken place.  Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 917 
(9th Cir. 2003). 
 112. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 442 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 113. See, for example, the United States Supreme Court’s discussion of what 
constitutes “excessive” punitive damages in BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 
559, 568 (1996).  The court refused to establish a specific ratio of punitive to economic 
damages above which an award becomes excessive, rejecting the notion that the line of 
permissible damages “is marked by a simple mathematical formula . . . .”  Id. at 582.  
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The exception would lie where the multiplier is most easily quantifiable, 
which would protect civil rights plaintiffs.  Thus, if a private plaintiff, 
unsupported by the actions of other public agencies, won an injunction 
against, for example, a discriminatory government practice, the application 
of any multiplier less than one may be an abuse of discretion subject to 
reversal.  On the other hand, the application of any multiplier above zero 
may be an abuse of discretion if a plaintiff’s attorney’s efforts merely 
involved filing a facially moot or frivolous complaint.  However, the 
adoption of a sliding scale rather than a binary determination will reduce the 
incentive of litigants to file appeals in all but the most egregious cases. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
These modest reform proposals are an attempt to forestall the 
potentially devastating effects of the California Supreme Court’s 
decision in Graham on judicial economy in the state’s courts.  The 
California legislature has undertaken major legislative projects to reduce 
the amount of litigation in the courts without denying remedies to 
meritorious plaintiffs.  To this end, it has enacted fast track requirements 
and limited fee shifting following settlement conferences.114  The Graham 
decision will severely undermine these efforts by encouraging socially 
unproductive tagalong suits through the catalyst theory.  Moreover, Graham 
further shifts the risks of litigation away from plaintiffs by extending the 
rationale of civil rights fee-shifting to suits that seek to vindicate economic 
interests without transcendent benefits for society.  Such a regime threatens 
to subvert the policy goals of loss spreading by further severing the 
connections between the prophylactic measures undertaken by corporate 
defendants and their expected liabilities.  Ultimately, it is the California 
consumer who will pay higher prices without any appreciable benefit in 
terms of improved public safety.  The adoption of a stricter definition of 
“public interest” litigation and a comparative catalyst rule will serve to 
stem the flood of unproductive lawsuits the high court’s ill-conceived 




Instead, the court noted that the 500 to 1 ratio in Gore was an order of magnitude higher 
than anything that had been previously upheld by the Supreme Court.  Id. at 581-83. 
 114. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. 
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